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This paper investigates the methodological problems associated with the use of 
housing market data to measure the willingness to pay for clean air. With the use 
of a hedonic housing price model and data for the Boston metropolitan area, quanti- 
tative estimates of the willingness to pay for air quality improvements are generated. 
Marginal air pollution damages (as revealed in the housing market) are found to 
increase with the level of air pollution and with household income. The results are 
relatively sensitive to the specification of the hedonic housing price equation, but 
insensitive to the specification of the air quality demand equation. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Expressing the benefits of reduced urban air pollution concentrations in 
monetary terms is a difficult task, despite the fact that the general nature of the 
benefits is reasonably well established.’ Several attempts have been made to 
utilize economic analysis to estimate the dollar benefits of air quality improve- 
ments. One approach is to proxy willingness to pay by measuring either the 
added cost to society from increased air pollution, or equivalently the reduced 
costs associated with air quality improvement.” A second technique infers willing- 
1 This research was supported by the National Bureau of Economic Research. All statistical 
analyses were performed on the NBER Center for Computational Research’s TROLL System. 
We wish to thank members of the NBER for their technical advice; William Apgar, A. Myrick 
Freeman, Gregory Ingram, John Kain, Robert McDonald, and two anonymous referees for 
helpful comments on earlier drafts; Gary Fauth, Gregory Ingram, Eugene Kroch, Robert 
McDonald, and Ann Schnare for providing data used in this study; and Laxmi Rao of the 
NBER for providing helpful research assistance. 
2 Studies have documented the damages which high concentrations of air pollutants impose 
on human health, on vegetation, on various materials and fibers, and on the aesthetic ele- 
ments of urban living. While urban residents perceive some of the damage, such as eye 
irritation, hazy skies, and dirty paint, other damage is only evident to trained researchers. 
For a summary of these damage studies, see Harrison [q]. 
s This approach has been used in a number of studies to evaluate the costs of air pollu- 
tion to plants, materials, or human health. For example, Lave and Seskin [I91 used statistical 
estimates of the effect of air pollution on morbidity and mortality rates to compute increases 
in health costs and decreases in earning capacity attributed to higher air pollution levels. 
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ness to pay for better air quality from an analysis of the housing market, on the 
presumption that individuals will pay more for a unit located in an area with 
good air quality than for an otherwise identical unit located in an area with 
poor air quality.4 
This paper investigates the methodological problems associated with the 
housing market approach. While several studies have used this methodology to 
estimate the demand for air quality improvements, they have paid little atten- 
tion to the sensitivity of the results to the assumptions embedded in the pro- 
cedures.5 Using data for the Boston housing market, we generate quantitative 
estimates of the willingness to pay for air quality improvements and test the 
sensitivity of these results to alternative specifications of the basic building 
blocks in the procedure. Our data base is superior to others because it contains 
a large number of neighborhood variables (necessary to isolate the independent 
influence of air pollution) and more reliable air pollution data. 
Section II of this paper describes the four-step procedural model which is the 
basis of our empirical investigations. The first step is to estimate a hedonic 
housing value equation with air pollution as one housing attribute; the second 
step is to calculate each households willingness to pay for a marginal change 
in air pollution from the hedonic housing value equation; the third step is to 
estimate a marginal willingness-to-pay function for households in the urban area, 
a function that is analogous to a demand curve for clean air; and the fourth 
step is to use the willingness-to-pay function, along with estimates of air pollu- 
tion concentrations before and after pollution controls, to calculate the per house- 
hold dollar benefits of the control strategy. Section III gives empirical results 
for different specifications of the housing value equation, and Section IV pre- 
sents the corresponding results for various specifications of the marginal willing- 
ness-to-pay function. Section V illustrates the average dollar benefits of the 
federal automobile emission control program to Boston area residents, emphasiz- 
ing the sensitivity of the average benefit figure to alternative specifications of 
the housing value and willingness-to-pay functions. 
II. THE PROCEDURAL MODEL 
In this section we present a procedural model for measuring the willingness 
to pay for improvements in air quality. Our model is based on a theoretical 
structure which assumes that households consider the level of air pollution as 
well as the quantity and quality of housing and other neighborhood charac- 
teristics in making their housing choices. Housing value differentials then provide 
the starting point for estimating households’ willingness to pay for reductions 
in air pollutant concentrations. Since the issues associated with the theoretical 
construct used here have been considered in detail in other papers, we present 
the theory in only rudimentary form. 6 Some of the important underlying assump- 
tions are noted, but we refer the reader to the cited literature for further details. 
*We stress that housing market studies of this type at best can only ascertain those 
benefits which are perceived by households. It is clear that individuals are not aware of all 
potential health hazards associated with air pollution and are often ignorant of the degree to 
which the air they breathe is polluted. 
5 Housing price studies which have investigated the willingness to pay for clear air in- 
clude [l, 10, 22, 27, and 351. 
6 The most complete treatment of the theoretical issues is in [28]. 
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Our theoretical model assumes that individual households maximize a utility 
function 
u(x:, h) (2.1) 
subject to the budget constraint 
Y =x+p(h) + T (2.2) 
where : 
x = quantity of composite private goods, whose price is set equal to one’ 
h = (h,;.., h,) is a bundle of housing attributes, including accessibility, 
structure and neighborhood characteristics, and air pollution 
concentrations, 
y = annual money income, 
p(h) = housing (or hedonic) price function, and 
T = money cost of transportation. 
Our specification of the utility function (2.1) implies that housing is appropri- 
ately viewed as a bundle of attributes, rather than as a single commodity.’ To 
simplify our discussion we shall arbitrarily associate the first housing attribute, 
hl, with a single measure of air pollution and label it “a”. In order to apply the 
calculus to the utility maximization problem for the household we assume that 
U is strictly concave with regard to the various housing attributes (when viewed 
as goods rather than bads).8 
The first step in our procedural model is to specify the hedonic housing value 
function, p(h). The p(h) f unction translates a vector of housing attributes at 
each location into a price which influences the decisions of both suppliers and 
demanders of housing attributes .Q Implicit in this description of the hedonic 
housing function are the following important assumptions: 
(1) All consumers accurately perceive the characteristics represented by 
the vector h at every location. 
(2) There is sufficient variation in h so that the function p(h) is continuous, 
with continuous first and second partial derivatives. 
(3) The market is in short-run equilibrium. 
7 For some applications of the hedonic approach to the analysis of housing demand, see 
[4, 12-15, 17, 22, and 321. For more general discussions of the hedonic approach to consumer 
demand, see [8, 17, 20, and 281. 
s We could have generalized the specification of the utility function to allow for the house- 
hold production of housing services from the housing attributes, but we chose not to do so. 
Such a generalization adds an additional complication which is not necessary for our pur- 
poses; but it would make explicit the fact that housing price differentials may arise from 
differences in household consumption technologies as well as from differences in households’ 
tastes for housing attributes. For some insightful discussions of the relevance of household 
production theory for the problems of estimating hedonic price functions, see [17, 21, 22, 26, 
and 311. 
9 We have chosen to write the theoretical model in terms of annual rental prices, although 
our empirical work uses housing values (capitalized streams of annual rental prices) in 
conformity with other studies. Conceptually, rental prices are more appropriate because they 
reflect the market’s current valuation of housing attributes. Housing values, on the other 
hand, reflect the market’s expectations about future as well as present housing conditions. 
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(4) Spatial variations in housing characteristics ( including air pollution) 
are capitalized into differentials in housing prices.IO 
Note that the p(h) relationship between housing attributes and house prices 
need not be linear. Nonlinearities may exist in part because the market may not 
be in long-run equilibrium-unlike the attributes of less durable commodities, 
housing attributes cannot be untied and repackaged to produce an arbitrary set 
of attributes at all locations. For example, a nonlinear relationship observed in 
an hedonic equation between the number of rooms and housing value may in 
part reflect disequilibrium supply conditions and in part reflect varying marginal 
benefits from extra increments of interior space. Similar conditions may hold for 
air pollution and other neighborhood attributes. In fact, supply conditions are 
more complex for neighborhood characteristics than for structural attributes 
since there is no long-run neighborhood attribute s~~pply price equivalent to the 
construction cost for rooms and other structural components. 
The second procedural step, calculating each household’s willingness to pay 
for a marginal change in air pollution, follows from the first order condition for 
utility maximization (when Eq. (2.1) is maximized subject to Eq. (2.2) ) with 
respect to the air pollution attribute, a. This first order condition is given below 
as Eq. (2.3): 
dfT/d(-a) dp (h) 
w, (IL) = --__ = -~--- = 
d I,:/& 8(-a) 
pu (II) (2.3) 
Equation (2.3) states that in equilibrium the household’s amlual willingness to pay 
for a small improvement in air quality [ W,( h) ] is equal to the increased cost 
[p,(h)] incurred in purchasing (or renting) a different house with identical 
attributes except for a marginal improvement in air quality. Thus the second 
step consists of calculating the derivatives of the hedonic housing price equation 
with respect to the air pollution attribute, i.e., @I( h)/cY( -u). Calculated sepa- 
rately for each household, this derivative is an estimate of W,(h), the house- 
hold’s willingness to pay for a marginal improvement in air pollution. 
To determine each household’s willingness to pay for nonmarginal improve- 
ments in air quality we need to estimate the relationship between the air pollu- 
tion level and marginal willingness to pay, i.e., the W,(h) schedule.11 Estimat- 
ing the W,(h) schedule is the third step in the procedural model. The W,(h) 
function is estimated in our model by regressing households’ marginal valuations 
(the derivatives calculated in the second step for each household) on air pollu- 
10 A competitive market is not sufficient to guarantee that differentials in air quality will 
be capitalized into housing prices. For example, full capitalization may not take place in a 
model in which there are endogenous labor markets (see Polinsky and Rubinfeld [24] and 
[25] for details). An excess supply of undistinguishable low-pollution areas may also prevent 
full capitalization of air pollution differences. 
11 The schedule we seek is the inverse of the compensated demand curve for the air 
quality attribute (see [Sl). It can be conceptualized by considering the following experi- 
ment. Let the level of utility attained by the household in equilibrium be fixed. Then fix the 
household’s location, its consumption of the composite good, and all housing attributes other 
than air quality. The total willingness to pay for a given decrease in air pollution is the 
maximum amount of income the household is willing to give up to keep the decreased level 
of air pollution. W,(h), the marginal willingness to pay for decreases in air pollution con- 
centration, is equal to the derivative of the total willingness-to-pay function with respect to 
air pollution concentration. 
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tion concentration and other variables (household income, for example) which 
may cause the demand for cleaner air to shift. Section IV presents results for 
several specifications of the W,(h) function as well as the results of estimating 
the W,(h) function from alternative hedonic housing value equations. 
Before estimating the marginal willingness-to-pay function, we must ask 
whether it is possible to identify W,(h) f rom the available housing market data. 
This is a classic identification problem, since one can imagine a supply as well 
as a demand function for each housing attribute at every location. However, in 
the case of air pollution it seems reasonable to assume that the supply is either 
exogenously fixed or at least unresponsive to changes in household tastes, so 
that variations in the level of air pollution over space allow us to identify infor- 
mation about households’ demand for clean air.12 Thus, we proceed under the 
assumption that it is possible to identify households’ willingness to pay for clean 
air from the housing market data. 
The fourth and final step in evaluating the dollar benefits of a scheme to 
improve urban air quality is to use the willingness-to-pay schedule to place a 
dollar value on physical improvements in air quality estimated by a meteorologi- 
cal airshed model. In Section V we perform such an exercise and estimate the 
dollar benefits of the federal automobile emission control strategy in the Boston 
metropolitan area. Estimates of pollutant concentrations both with and without 
federal automobile emission controls were obtained from a meteorological model 
of the Boston airshed. The per household willingness to pay for substantial 
reductions in air pollution can be calculated for households at each location by 
integrating W, ( h ) f rom the old concentration to the new air pollution concen- 
tration. Since the dependent variable in the first step hedonic equation is housing 
value, the integral of willingness to pay is an estimate of the capitalized value 
of the air quality improvement to each household. To obtain an annual value a 
discount rate must be applied. 
The example in Section V compares results in terms of the average annual 
dollar benefits per household, which is calculated as a weighted average of the 
dollar benefits for households in each of the geographic areas (census tracts) 
used in the estimation procedure. Comparing average benefit figures illustrates 
the sensitivity of the final results to alternative specifications of the hedonic 
housing value function and of the willingness-to-pay function, the two empirical 
building blocks in our procedural model of benefit estimation. The specifications 
used in the example and explanations of their derivations are presented below 
in Section III (housing value equation) and Section IV (willingness-to-pay 
equation). 
III. HOUSING VALUE EQUATION 
This study utilizes data for census tracts in the Boston Standard Metropolitan 
Statistical Area (SMSA) in 1970. Following the example of most studies of this 
kind, we focus on the owner market. Thus, the dependent variable in our housing 
equation is the median value of the owner-occupied homes in the census tract.‘” 
12 Our empirical estimates test for the importance of possible supply shifts, and we con- 
clude that they have a minor influence on benefit estimates. 
13 There is some controversy about the proper dependent variable in a housing value 
equation. See, for example, Wieand [351 who argues that the correct dependent variable is 
the unit price of housing, proxied by housing value per unit of land. 
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The independent variables in the equation include two structural attribute vari- 
ables, eight neighborhood variables, two accessibility variables, and one air 
pollution variable. The pollution variable used in the empirical estimates is the 
concentration of nitrogen oxides (NOX). The NOX variable is used to proxy 
air quality since the air pollution variables in our data base are so highly corre- 
lated that specifying their independent impacts on housing values in the Boston 
SMSA would be extremely difficult .I4 Descriptions of the data we employed and 
full results of our estimation of the equation are given in the Appendix. 
One of the major objectives in estimating the hedonic housing equation was 
to determine the best fitting functional form. Comparing models with either 
median value of owner-occupied homes (MV) or Log( MV) as the dependent 
variable, we found that the semilog version provided a slightly better fit. Using 
Log( MV) as the dependent variable, we concentrated on estimating a nonlinear 
term in NOX; i.e., we included NOXp in the equation, where p is an unknown 
parameter. Determining the proper exponent on NOX in the housing value 
equation is important because different exponents imply different patterns of the 
influence of air pollution on housing values and thus different patterns for the 
willingness to pay for air quality improvements. 
The statistical fit in the equation was best when p was set equal to 2.0, i.e., 
when NOX2 was in the equation. I5 This “basic equation” (see Table VII in the 
Appendix) is used in the remainder of the paper to generate estimates of the 
willingness to pay for air pollution reduction. The equation conforms well to 
our a priori expectations about the influence of each variable on median housing 
values. Virtually all coefficients have the expected sign and are statistically sig- 
nificant.lG The high R2 (0.81) indicates that the variables in the equation account 
for much of the variation in median housing values observed in the Boston 
SMSA in 197O.l’ The NOX variable has a negative sign and is highly significant. 
14 Air pollutant variables are often not so highly correlated. There are two likely reasons 
why we observed a high correlation between NOX and particulates (PART), the other 
major air pollutant we hypothesized would influence housing values. First, while in many 
urban areas NOX is primarily an automobile pollutant and PART is a stationary source pol- 
lutant, in Boston only 79,388 tons out of an estimated 201,743 tons of NOX emissions were 
accounted for by automobile emissions. Since the stationary source emitters of both NOX 
and PART tend to be in central city zones, the result is a high correlation between the two 
variables, which is not observed in urban areas in which automotive emissions account for 
the bulk of total NOX emissions. Second, the true correlation between NOX and PART is 
somewhat overstated because the TASSIM model generates data for 122 zones, not 506 
census tracts. Translating zonal data into census tract data tends to overstate the correlation 
because relatively more census tracts are located in center city zones in which PART and 
NOX levels tend to be most highly correlated. 
15 The exponent was estimated by performing a grid search over alternative parameter 
values for p in the term NOX*‘-l/( p - 1). The usefulness of this particular transformation of 
the NOX variable is described in Box and Cox [3] and in Kmenta [16, pp. 467-4681. The 
value for p was estimated by a grid search rather than by direct nonlinear estimation be- 
cause of computational difficulties we encountered with the nonlinear estimation method. 
16 There are some exceptions. For example, the AGE variable is positive and statistically 
insignificant, probably because in Boston AGE does not correlate closely with housing quality 
(since many older units are of high quality). 
17 We were concerned that multicollinearity among neighborhood, accessibility, and air 
quality variables might be a problem. (The simple correlations among variables appear in 
Table VI.) In fact, we did find that when both NOX and particulate concentration (PART) 
appear in the same equation, collinearity does become serious. In some specifications with 
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Assessing the quantitative importance of the NOX coefficient ( -0.0064) requires 
some calculation because, with the nonlinear specification, the change in housing 
value resulting from a one pphm (part per hundred million) change in NOX 
concentration depends upon the level of NOX and the levels of the other ex- 
planatory variables. When NOX and the other variables take on their mean 
values, the change in median housing values from a one pphm change in NOX 
is $1613.l* 
We also estimated the same housing value equation substituting PART for 
NOX (see Table VII). The coefficient of PART4 is negative and statistically very 
significantl” In addition, the coefficients of the nonpollution variables are vir- 
tually the same with PART or NOX in the equation, adding credence to the 
view that the various pollution variables are reflecting households’ aversion to 
pollution generally rather than to individual pollutants. 
While NOX” was determined to be the superior NOX term, the nonlinear 
least squares grid search suggested that we could not place great confidence in 
the precise exponent of 2.?O Because of the distinct possibility that the true value 
for p is some value other than 2, our later uses of the housing value equation 
include results for exponents of the NOX variable ranging from 1.0 (the linear 
semilog form) to 3.0. As an additional test of the sensitivity of the results to non- 
linearities in NOX, we estimated an equation including both log( NOX) and 
log (NOX)“, the first two terms in a Taylor series approximation to NOXP, and 
one including both NOX and NOX2. Most of the coefficient estimates were not 
substantially different from those in the “basic equation” with NOX? as the sole 
air pollution term. The application in Section V provides comparisons of benefit 
estimates when these other formulations are used. 
The “basic equation” was substantially unchanged when corrected for hetero- 
scedasticity. Because our empirical analysis is based on census tract data rather 
than individual observations we anticipated that heteroscedasticity might be a 
both NOX and PART appearing, the coefficient on NOX became positive. However, the 
problem is simplified if one is willing to alter the specification to include a single pollutant 
measure. To test for the presence of multicollinearity with a single pollutant measure, we 
experimented to see whether the use of ridge regression techniques might alter our parameter 
estimates (they did not). In addition, we did a singular value decomposition of the matrix 
of explanatory variable data as described in Belsley and Klema [21. The singular value de- 
composition is a numerical analysis technique which is useful for determining the extent to 
which there are linear dependencies among the columns of the explanatory variable matrix. 
Specifically, the Nxk matrix X is decomposed as X = UZV’, where Z: is a diagonal matrix 
whose diagonal elements (called singular values) are the square roots of the eigenvalues of 
X’X. Low singular values imply near linear dependencies and thus a severe multicollinearity 
problem. The relatively high values we obtained indicated that multicollinearity does not 
permit a serious problem in estimating the housing value equation, 
18 We were also concerned about the sensitivity of the model parameters to the data, 
Tests of this kind, which involve reestimating the model without one or more data points, are 
described in detail in Welsch [341. In general, the coefficient on NOX is quite insensitive to 
the omission of individual or small groups of data points. 
19 The nonlinear estimation procedure using PART results in an exponent of 4.0, and thus 
the equation listed in Table VII for PART uses PART 4 as the variable. 
20 Because we used a grid search estimation procedure, we were not able to determine an 
exact standard error for p. However, by using a standard nonlinear estimation routine and 
an initial estimate of p = 2, we were able to approximate the asymptotic standard error of p 
as being equal to 1.3. 
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problem. To test for heteroscedasticity we applied a Park-Glejser procedure to 
the “basic equation.” On this basis we rejected the null hypothesis of homoscedas- 
ticity at the 5% levelzl To correct for heteroscedasticity we reestimated the 
housing value equation using weighted least squares; the result is presented in 
Table VII. Most of the coefficients were essentially unchanged, with the coeffi- 
cient on NOX’ falling in absolute value from -0.0064 to -0.0058. The example 
in Section V includes results which account for this heteroscedasticity correction 
in the housing value equation. 
Changes in the specification of the nonpollution variables in the housing value 
equation did change the results substantially. When the two accessibility vari- 
ables, weighted distance to Boston area employment centers (DZS) and the 
index of accessibility to radial highways (RAD) were deleted; the coefficient of 
NOX” changed from -0.0064 to -0.0036. Because concentrations of NOX in 
Boston are higher in areas closest to the major employment centers and radial 
highways, deleting DZS and RAD from the equation tends to reduce the mea- 
sured impact of NOX concentrations on housing values. The coefficient of NOX 
with DZS and RAD omitted reflects both the disadvantages of greater NOX 
concentrations and the advantages of greater accessibility. It is, therefore, sub- 
stantially biased. The same specification bias occurs when proportion of the 
population that is lower status (LSTAT) is deleted from the equation, except 
that the direction of bias is the opposite. The coefficient of NOX changes from 
-0.0064 to -0.0081 when LSTAT is eliminated. Deleting LSTAT tends to 
credit NOX concentration with some of the neighborhood disamenities resulting 
from a high proportion of lower status households. These alternative specifica- 
tions illustrate the dangers of interpreting coefficients in poorly specified equa- 
tions. We discuss the quantitative impact of the specification differences on the 
calculated willingness to pay for improved air quality in Section V. 
IV. WILLINGNESS-TO-PAY EQUATION 
By calculating the derivative of the housing value equation with respect to 
NOX (the second step in our procedural model), we obtain information on the 
amount of money that households would be willing to pay for small reductions in 
air pollution levels in their census tracts. As discussed in Section II, this infor- 
mation is used in the third step to estimate a schedule relating willingness to 
pay for marginal improvements to the level of air pollution and other variables. 
Table I presents five formulations of the willingness-to-pay equation, all based 
on the “basic” housing value equation. The first two equations assume a linear 
relationship between the willingness to pay for a marginal change in NOX con- 
centration and the NOX level, household income (ZNC), and (in Eq. (4.2) ) 
persons per dwelling unit (PDU). The other three equations postulate a log-log 
relationship.” 
21 We regressed the logarithm of the square of the residuals against the logarithm of total 
dwelling units in a linear regression. The intercept of -1.54 was insignificant, but the slope 
of -0.48 was significant at the 5% level (the t value was -2.44 ). This test is described in 
16, 7, and 231. 
22 Our willingness-to-pay equations are estimated using ordinary least squares under the 
assumption that the supply of air pollution is perfectly inelastic at each location. This assump- 
tion is reasonab!e in terms of short-run crosssection analysis, but may be suspect in a longer 
run context. To test the sensitivity of our results to the potential simultaneity problem caused 
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Willingness t,o Pay for Air Pollutiou Iteduct,ion Based on Nonlinear Housing Value Equation” 
Linear Equations* II- 
(4.1) w = - 1040 + 209 NOS + 12.1 zsc 0.5“ 
(4.2) W’ = -581 + 1X9 SOS + 12.4 ISC - 119,s PDl: 0.55 
Log-log Eqrlat.ions* 
(4.3) log l+- = 1.08 + 0.57 log NOY + 1.00 log ISC 0.w 
(4.4) log W = 1.05 + 0.78 log NOX + 1.01 log ZSC - 0.24 log PDlJ 0.64 
(4.5) log w = 2.20 + 0.97 log 1VOX + O.SO log I.\TC - 0.03 (Yl) (log I\TOX) 
- 0.07 (Y2) (log ,VOX) 0.64 
* All coeficient,s are significant at the 0.01 level. 
a W = marginal willingness to pay ($) ; ArOX = nitrogen oxides concentration in pphm; 
INC = household income in hundreds of dollars; PDU = persons per dwelling unit; Yl = 1 
when 95 >_ ZNC > 130, 0 otherwise; Y2 = 1 when ISC 2 130, 0 otherwise. 
The relationship between marginal willingness to pay, NOX level and house- 
hold income implied by these results is depicted graphically in Fig. 1 for Eq. 
(4.3). The three curves illustrate the marginal willingness to pay as a function 
of NOX level for three income levels, low ($8500 per year), medium ($11,500 
per year), and high ($15,000 per year). The positive slope for all curves implies 
that households perceive at least some damages from air pollution to be greater 
at higher pollution levels. Thus the willingness to pay for marginal reductions 
is greater as pollution levels increase. Moreover, these differences seem to be 
substantial for the NOX levels existing in Boston census tracts in 1970, where 
the average NOX level ranges from approximately 3 pphm to 9 pphm. For 
example, a middle-income household earning $11,500 per year would be willing 
to pay roughly $800 for a 1 pphm improvement in NOX when the NOX level is 
3 pphm, while the willingness-to-pay figure would jump to approximately $2200 
when the NOX level is 9 pphm. Figure 1 also shows that the willingness to pay 
for a marginal improvement in NOX concentration is greater for households in 
higher income groups. 
The straight line at $2052 illustrates the willingness-to-pay curve implicit in 
a simple linear housing value equation (i.e., with hlV as the dependent variable 
and NOX in the equation) in which households are assullied to place the same 
dollar value on a 1 pphm improvement in NOX regardless of the existing level 
of air pollution and their income level. Our results suggest that the assumption 
of a constant willingness to pay is unwarranted. Indeed, it appears that the total 
- 
by a less than perfectly inelastic supply of air pollution, we estimated the willingness-to-pay 
equation using two-stage least squares, with INDUS, PDU (possible supply variables) and 
ZNC appearing in the first stage reduced form equation. The two-stage least squares esti- 
mate of the pollution elasticity fell to 0.70, while the income elasticity fell to 0.93. These 
changes in elasticity had little impact on the nonmarginal benefit calculations described in the 
next section. We also tested the log-log willingness-to-pay equation for heteroscedasticity by 
applying the Park-Glejser test described in the previous section. After rejecting the null 
hypothesis at the 5% level, we reestimated the willingness-to-pay equation using weighted 
least squares. The weighted least squares equation was log (W) = 0.91 + 0.96 log (NOX) + 
1.01 log (INC ), with all parameters significant at the 1% level. We report the impact of 
this adjustment on estimated benefits in the following section. 
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willingness to pay for air pollution reduction varies a great deal depending upon 
the existing air pollution levels in the urban area and the income profile of the 
population. 
Figure 1 also indicates that the premium that high income households are pre- 
pared to pay rises as the NOX level increases. At low NOX levels (3 pphm), 
the differential for households earning $11,500 compared to households earning 
$8500 is only $200. But at high NOX levels (9 pphm), the differential is about 
$700. Equation (4.5) includes a test of the hypothesis that households in different 
income groups have different elasticities of willingness to pay with respect to 
NOX levels. Dummy variable interaction terms are presented for middle income 
households ($9500 to $13,090) and high income households (over $13,000). The 
negative coefficients on both interaction terms imply that the elasticity of willing- 
ness to pay with respect to NOX level is 0.97 for the low income group, 0.94 for 
households in the median income group, and 0.90 for households in the high 
income group.23 The larger willingness-to-pay elasticity for lower income house- 
holds suggests that as air pollution is reduced (other things equal), the marginal 
valuation of air quality improvements declines more rapidly for lower income 
households than for middle-income and high-income households.*” 
V. AN ILLUSTRATION: THE WILLINGNESS TO PAY FOR 
FEDERAL AUTOMOBILE EMISSION CONTROLS 
To illustrate the fourth and final step of our procedural model, this section 
estimates the housing value benefits associated with a program to improve 
Boston area air quality. Specifically, we consider the benefits from the federal 
automobile emission control strategy, in which the federal government estab- 
lished tailpipe emission standards for new cars beginning in model year 1971. 
These emission standards became increasingly stringent up to the 1978 year 
model, when a roughly 90% reduction from the 1970 levels is mandated for 
nitrogen oxides, hydrocarbons, and carbon monoxide. 
The purpose of this illustration is not to determine the precise dollar figure for 
benefits from this control strategy. Rather, it is to illustrate the sensitivity of the 
benefit figure to different specifications of the housing value and willingness-to- 
pay equations. Much greater care would be necessary to separate out the inde- 
pendent influence of the automobile pollutants from the overall air pollution in 
the Boston area in order to estimate with confidence the precise dollar value of 
the federal automobile emission control program.?” 
23 These elasticities are statistically different from each other at the 5% level. 
24 We do not present any results in which housing attributes other than air quality appear 
in the willingness-to-pay equation. We found that the inclusion of other housing attributes had 
very little effect on our estimates of the willingness to pay for nonmarginal changes in air 
quality. However, it is possible that some housing attributes are complementary to (or sub- 
stitutable with) reduced air pollution so that households consuming greater (lesser) quan- 
tities of those attributes would be willing to pay more (less) for NOX improvements. For 
example, we tested the hypothesis that air quality and the number of rooms (RM) are com- 
plimentary, and the results confirmed the hypothesis (all t tests were highly significant): 
log W = 0.71 + 0.81 log (NOX) + 0.78 log (INC) + 0.84 log (RM). 
25 It is difficult to say with assurance whether our benefit figures are overestimates or 
underestimates of the true dollar value that Boston households place on the air quality im- 
provements generated by stringent auto controls. Benefits may be overestimated because the 
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FIG. 1. Willingness to pay for 1 pphm improvement in NOX concentration, by NOX level 
for households in three income levels (log-log version). 
The physical changes in NOX concentrations in each of the 506 Boston SMSA 
census tracts were calculated for 1990 using the Transportation and Air Shed 
Simulation Model (TASSIM ), 26 The average dollar value of these physical 
improvements in NOX concentration depends upon the amount each household 
is willing to pay for the physical improvement they experience.27 The results 
given in Sections III and IV for the first three steps permit us to estimate the 
average dollar value under various assumptions about the function relating 
housing values to NOX concentration and other variables, and the function re- 
lating willingness to pay for marginal changes in NOX to the NOX level and 
various household characteristics. The full range of potential estimates of average 
dollar benefits calculated in the fourth step can be visualized as a matrix with 
NOX variable may reflect the disbenefits associated with particulates and other nonauto pol- 
lutants. Note that our calcu’ations do not assume any reduction in nonauto sources of NOX 
(the physical changes in NOX predicted from auto controls are relatively small because of the 
large contribution of other NOX sources in the Boston airshed), and thus the auto benefits are 
not overstated for that reason. Auto benefits may be understated because the value of re- 
ducing carbon monoxide and hydrocarbon emissions may not be taken into account and 
because the full dollar benefits of the auto emission control strategy includes some benefits 
which are not likely to be reflected in housing prices. 
20 For a description of the TASSIM model, see Ingram and Fauth [ll]. The estimates of 
1990 NOX concentrations in Boston subareas were obtained in TASSIM by substituting the 
emissions characteristics of the 1990 controlled fleet for the 1970 fleet emissions figures used 
in the basic run. The physical benefits of the federal automobile emission program are then 
simply the difference between NOX concentrations in 1970 and 1990. 
27 Our calculations assume that households are only willing to pay for air quality improve- 
ments in their residence tract. Some household members may also experience benefits in other 
tracts, where they work, shop, or visit. 
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the rows corresponding to different formulations of the housing value equation 
and the columns corresponding to different formulations of the willingness-to- 
pay equation. However, it is not necessary to present the full matrix of estimates 
to gain an appreciation of the sensitivity of the results to alternative specifications 
of the two building block equations. 
Table II presents average annual benefits per household for four formulations 
of the housing value equation and two versions of the willingness-to-pay equa- 
tion. The largest estimate of average household benefits ($118) is derived from 
a linear housing value equatiomZx This is the specification often employed in 
previous housing value studies. The linear equation contains the implicit assump- 
tion that every unit reduction in NOX concentration is valued identically by all 
households. The willingnes-to-pay function for all households is then a horizontal 
line at the unit “price” for NOX estimated by the linear housing value equation 
(see Fig. 1, where W = $2050). 
The other results reported in Table II are equations based on a semilog specifi- 
cation of the housing value equation (which inherently allows for variations in 
marginal willingness to pay) that differ in the exponent assigned to NOX. The 
benefit estimate in which we place the greatest confidence is obtained from the 
semilog housing value equation with the exponent of NOX equal to 2 (the “basic 
equation”) and the log-log willingness-to-pay equation. This combination yields 
a benefit estimate of $83 per household per year, approximately 30% below the 
figure based on a linear housing value equation.?” This $83 estimate takes into 
account the fact that households’ willingness to pay for marginal reductions in 
air pollution may vary with the pollution concentration (a movement along the 
willingness-to-pay curve; see Fig. l), as well as with household income (a shift 
in the willingness-to-pay curve). The benefit estimate of $92 given in the second 
column indicates that if one were to allow willingness to pay to vary by tract 
but not be systematically related to the level of pollution and income (i.e., 
neglect the willingness-to-pay function), benefits would be overestimated by 
approximately 11%. 
Calculating average benefit figures for the entire SMSA ignores variations in 
average benefits enjoyed by subgroups of the population classified by income, 
race, and other variables. To illustrate the distributional information that our 
2s The formula used to calculate annual benefits per household in 1990 for the linear 
specification is: 
where: AB = average annual benefits per household (in dollars) from emission controls; 
HHt = number of households in census tract i; 4 NOXb = improvement in NOX concentra- 
tions in tract i in 1990 compared to 1970; a, = coefficient of NOX from linear housing value 
equation; N = number of census tracts in sample (N = 506). Dividing average benefits by 
10, implying a discount rate of 1070, yields an estimate of average annual benefits. 
20 The average dollar value is calculated as in the previous footnote, except that average 
benefit per household, B,, is substituted for the product (A NOXl) (a,). BI is calculated as 
follows : 
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TABLE II 
Average Annual Benefits per Household in Bost,on SMSA From Change in X0X Levels due to 




Assume Assume W 
11’ = j(XOX, ISC) constant, 
(log-log version) 
Linear $118.00 
Semi log (P = 1) $101.26 105.26 
Semi log (P = 2) 83.00 92.03 
Semi log (P = 3) 59.17 78.32 
model can generate, we estimated the average benefits for three income classes.3o 
We found that low income households received the highest benefit ($93), while 
high income households had the lowest average benefit ($71). Low income 
households receive the greatest dollar benefit because they live in highly pol- 
luted areas that experience the greatest reduction in pollution from auto emission 
controls. 
The remaining results in Table II are tests of the sensitivity of benefits to the 
exponent of NOX in the housing value equation. Altering the exponent on the 
air pollution term from 2.0 yields markedly different average benefit figures. 
Average benefits are greatest for the semilog case (among the three values listed 
in Table II) when the exponent is put at 1.0, i.e., when NOX is entered in the 
equation. For the case when the log-log willingness-to-pay equation is used to 
generate average benefits, average benefits increase from $83 to $101 when the 
exponent changes from 2.0 to 1.0. This change represents a 22% increase in 
average benefits. The change is just as dramatic when the exponent is assumed 
to be 3.0 rather than 2.0. Average benefits decline from their baseline value of 
$83 to only $59, a 299, drop. Since we estimated a standard error of 1.3 on the 
exponent of 2.0 for NOX, we conclude that the “true” value for average benefits 
in this case could easily range from approximately $60 per year to over $100 
per year, depending upon which specification of the NOX variable is the “true” 
one. 
We also tested for the sensitivity of average benefits per household to different 
specifications of the willingness-to-pay function when the “basic” housing value 
equation was used. These results (not reported here) indicate that the choice 
of a specific willingness-to-pay function does not greatly influence the average 
benefit figure. For example, when the linear rather than the log-log version of 
the willingness-to-pay equation with NOX and ZNC is used, average benefits 
only increase from $83 to $84. 
A great many other specifications of the housing value equation are possible, 
To explore the sensitivity of the average benefit figures to different housing value 
equations, we calculated average benefit figures using a single willingness-to-pay 
equation (the log-log version with NOX and ZNC) and several versions of the 
~10 Income groups were based on the following classification of census tracts by average 
household income: low income: = <$9500 per year; middle income: = $9500413,000 per 
year; high income: = >$13,000 per year. 
94 HARRISON AND RUBINFELD 
TABLE III 
Annual Benefits per Household-Sensitivity to Alternate Specifications 
and Various Statistical Problemsa 
Annual benefits 
per household ($) 
I. Housing price specifications 
(1) Basic (semilog, with NOX2) 
(2) Delete DIS and RAD 
(3) Delete LSTA T 
(4) Add NOX 
(5) Substitute log (NOX) and (log NOX)2 
(6) Income submarkets 
(7) Distance submarkets 
(8) Low status submarkets 
II. Statistical Corrections 
(9) Heteroscedasticity in housing value equation 76.03 
(10) Heteroscedasticity in willingness-to-pay equation 84.07 









a Unless otherwise indicated, all figures are based on the log-log specification of the willingness- 
to-pay equation : log W = f[log (NOX), log @NC)]. 
* This figure is based on the linear specification of the willingness-to-pay equation. 
housing value equation. These results are listed in Table III. The baseline figure 
is $83, which is the average benefit obtained using the “basic” housing value 
equation. 
The first experiment consisted of deleting some variables from the “basic 
equation.” Average benefits proved to be very sensitive to these experiments. 
When the two accessibility variables DIS and RAD were omitted from the 
specification, average benefits fell from $83 to $47. This decrease occurs because 
when DZS and RAD are omitted from the equation, some of the advantages of 
greater accessibility cancel out the disadvantages of higher NOX concentrations. 
Therefore, the benefits of reduced pollutant concentrations appear smaller. The 
same confusion occurs when LSTAT is deleted from the equation, except that 
omitting LSTAT increases the calculated average benefits from $83 to $105. 
When LSTAT is not in the equation, the empirical results attribute to high NOX 
levels some of the perceived disbenefits of being in an area with large propor- 
tions of lower status households. These results show that the benefits of reduced 
air pollution concentration may be substantially overestimated or underestimated 
if the equation used to describe the structure of the housing market is misspeci- 
fied. One should be particularly suspicious of estimates of dollar benefits from 
air pollution reductions which are based on formulations omitting important 
neighborhood and accessibility variables which are likely to be quite highly 
correlated with air pollution. 
The second experiment reported in Table III is to modify the housing value 
equation by including other nonlinear functional relationships for NOX. Includ- 
ing both NOX and NOX’ in the housing value equation somewhat decreases the 
average benefits, although the decline is not very great (from $83 to $79). A 
more substantial decrease occurs when log NOX and (log NOX)’ are substituted 
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for NOP in the equation. Average benefits in that case decline to $65.31 These 
results provide additional evidence of the sensitivity of the average benefit 
measure to the form in which air pollution influences housing values. 
The next three estimates in Table III [ (6)) (7), and (S)] provide the results 
of experiments which assume that the Boston SMSA housing market is actually 
a series of distinct submarkets. The aggregative census tract data used in this 
study do not allow us to calculate average benefits for detailed specifications of 
housing submarkets.“’ However, we tested for the variations in the average 
benefits when submarkets were postulated based on household income (three 
categories: low income, medium income, and high income), on accessibility to em- 
ployment (two categories: accessible, not accessible), and on socioeconomic status 
(two categories: high status, low status). The average benefits were calculated 
for the submarket cases by estimating separate housing market equations (the 
“basic equation”), using the results to estimate a single willingness-to-pay func- 
tion to calculate household benefits for each tract in the various submarkets, 
and then calculating average benefits from the Boston SMSA as a whole. While 
the specifications of the submarkets in these experiments are crude, the results in 
Table III indicate that the presence of submarkets may decrease average benefits 
substantially. In the most extreme case, when two submarkets are defined in 
terms of accessibility to major employment centers, the average benefits fall 
from $83 to $49. The $49 figure represents approximately a SO(b decline from the 
$118 estimate based on the linear housing value equation. 
The final estimates of average benefits in Table III reflect corrections for 
heteroscedasticity in the housing value equation and heteroscedasticity and 
simultaneity in the willingness-to-pay equation. The average benefit figures in 
Table III indicate that correcting for these possible statistical problems has a 
relatively small effect on the estimate of average benefits, although the average 
benefit figure does decline to $76 when a correction is made in the housing 
value equation. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Most empirical studies which attempt to measure the willingness to pay for 
cleaner air from housing value differentials (such as Ridker and Henning [27] ) 
estimate a hedonic equation in which housing values are regressed against pol- 
lution levels as well as other housing attributes. Freeman [5] and Small [30] 
have argued that the benefit estimation procedure used by Ridker and Henning 
and others is correct for valuing marginal improvements in air quality, But in 
using these regression results to estimate the total benefits arising from a non- 
marginal improvement in air quality, Ridker and Henning and other researchers 
implicitly assume that the value placed on a marginal improvement in air pollu- 
tion concentration is independent of the level of air pollution and independent 
~1 This $65 figure is based on a linear rather than a log-log version of the willingness-to- 
pay equation (because a log-log formulation could not be estimated), so the $65 figure is not 
directly comparable to the $83 figure. However, our results clearly indicate that the func- 
tional form of the willingness-to-pay equation has a small influence on average benefits. 
:(” Our attempts to define submarkets based on cross-classifications of several variables (the 
percent Black population in the census tract, the average tract income, the accessibility of the 
tract to employment centers, and the scl~ool quality in the tract) failed because many of the 
variables were constant or nearly constant within the s&markets. This result is a function of 
using average values for census tracts rather than individual observations on households. 














Variables used in the Housing Value I<:quations 
Definition 
Median value of owner-occupied homes. 
Average number of rooms in owner units. H!lI repre- 
sents spaciousness and, in a certain sense, quant,ity of 
housing. It, should be positively relat,ed to housing 
value. The RMz form was found to provide a bettel 
fit than either the linear or logarithnic forms. 
Proportion of owner units built prior to 1940. Unit 
age is generally relat,ed to structure qualit,y. 
Black proport ion of population. At low to Inoderate 
levels of B, an increase in L3 should have a negative 
influence on housing value if Blacks are regarded as 
undesirable neighbors by Whites. However, market 
discrimination means that housing values are higher 
at very high levels of R. One expects, therefore, a 
parabolic relationship between proportjion Black in a 
neighborhood and housing values. 
Proportion of populat,ion that is lower st.atus = f 
(proportion of adults without, some high school edrlca- 
tion and proportion of male workers classified as 
laborers). The logarithmic specification implies that 
socioeconomic status distinctions mean more in the 
upper brackets of societ,y than in the lower classes. 
Crime rate by town. Since CRfJ/ gauges the threat, to 
well-being that households perceive in various neigh- 
borhoods of the Boston met.ropolitan area (assuming 
that crime rates are generally proportional to people’s 
perceptions of danger) it should have a negat,ive effect, 
on housing values. 
Proportion of a town’s resideni,ial land zoned for lots 
greater l.han 25,000 square feet. Since such zoning re- 
stricts const,ruct,ion of small lot houses, we expect ZS 
to be positively related to housing values. A positive 
coefficient may also arise because zoning proxies the 
exclusivity, social class, and outdoor amenities of a 
community. 
Proportion nonretail business acres per town. ISDUS 
serves as a proxy for the externalities associated with 
industry-noise, heavy traffic, and unpleasant visual 
effects, and thus should affect housing values negatively. 
Full value property tax rate ($,/$lO,OOO). Measures 
the cost of public services in earh commlurity. Nomi- 
nal t,ax rates were correct,ed by local assessment ratios 
to yield the full value t,ax rat,e for each tmow-n. Intra- 
town differences in the assessment ratio were difficult, 
to obtain and thus not used. The coefficient of this 
variable should be negative. 
Source 
1!)70 U. S. Censlls 
1970 U. S. Census 
1970 U. S. Censris 
1970 U. 9. Census 
1970 U. S. Census 























Pupil-teacher rat,io by t,own school district. Measures Massachuaet ts Dept. of 
prtblic sector benefits in each town. The relation of the 15ducation (IQ71 -1 QTB) 
pupil&teacher rat,io to school quality is not entirely 
clear, although a low ratio should imply each student 
receives more individual att,ention. We expect the sign 
on PTlI’A7’10 to be negative. 
Charles River dummy : = 1 if tract bounds the Charles 1970 U. S. Census 
Iliver; =0 if ot,herwise. CHAS captrues the amenities Tract nuaps 
of a riverside locsation and (1111s the coeflicient should 
be positive. 
Weighted distances to five employment centers in the Srhnare CJQ] 
Boston region. According to t,raditional theories of 
urban land rent gradients, housing values should be 
higher near employment renters. DZS is entered in 
logarithm form; the expected sign is negative. 
Index of accessibility to radial highways. The highway 3lIT I3osiorr Pr,ojert, 
access index was calculated on a town b:lsis. Good 
road acress variables are needed so that allto pollution 
variables do not capture the locational advantages of 
roadways. IZAD captures other sorts of locational ad- 
vantages besides nearness to workplace. 1~ is entered 
in logarithmic form ; the experted sign is positive. 
Nitrogen oxide c’oncentrat ions in pphm (annual aver- TASSIRL 
age concentrat,ion in parts per hundred million). 
Part,iculat,e concentrations in mg/hcm3 (annual aver- TASSInt 
age concerrtt,ation in milligr~ams per hrmdred crtbic 
meters). 
- 
Slmunary Statistics for Housing Value Equation Variables 
Variable Mean Sl) 
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of household income and tastes. This is equivalent to assuming a linear dlamage 
function for air pollution that is identical for all households. 
The four-step estimation procedure used in this study allows us to conclude 
that marginal air pollution damages, at least as revealed in the housing market; 
increase with the level of air pollution and increase with the level of household 
income. By taking explicit account of these variations by estimating a willingness- 
to-pay function, we find that the improper use of marginal valuation estimates 
to calculate the benefits of nonmarginal improvements causes benefits to be 
overstated by approximately 3070. 
In the process of using our model to estimate households’ willingness t? pay, 
we found that the valuation placed on a marginal improvement in air quality is 
quite sensitive to the specification of the hedonic housing value equation. With 
plausible specifications of the relationship among air pollution, housing attributes, 
and housing values, aggregate benefit estimates may be reduced as much as 60% 
below the figure based on a constant marginal valuation. In contrast, the benefit 
estimates were found to be insensitive to the specification of the willingness-to- 
pay function. Neither modifying the functional form nor changing the specific 
variables included in the equation had a significant effect on the dollar value of 
benefits in the example we considered. 
APPENDIX: RESULTS FOR THE HOUSING VALUE EQUATION 
Most of the empirical results for the housing value equation are based on a 
common specification, as given in Eq. (A.l). 
log (MV) = al + azRM* + asAG& + aa log (DIS) + us log (RAD) + aeTAX 
+ a7PTRATI0 + a8(B - 0.63)2 + aglog (LSTAT) + a&RIM 
+allZN + allINDUS + a&HAS + algNOXP + e (Al) 
The study uses data for census tracts in the Boston Standard Metropolitan Sta- 
tistical Area (SMSA) in 1970. With tracts containing no housing units or com- 
prised entirely of institutions excluded, the Boston sample contains 506 census 
tracts. The definition of each variable, its expected sign, the data source, and the 
functional form in which each enters are indicated in Table IV. The sample 
means and standard deviations are reported in Table V, and the simple corre- 
lations among variables are given in Table VI. 
The data on 1970 air pollution concentrations used in this study were ob- 
tained from a meteorological model of the Boston air shed, the Transportation 
and Air Shed Simulation (TASSIM ) Model developed by Gregory Ingram and 
others.33 The TASSIM model generates surfaces of mean air pollutant concen- 
trations for the Boston SMSA which are then adjusted (or calibrated) using 
regression equations which compare TASSIM output to monitoring data.“4 Nine- 
33 The TASSIM Model is described in [ll]. 
34 It is likely that individuals are sensitive to variations in pollution levels as well as annual 
means. For any averaging period, Larsen [18] found that the readings over 1 year were dis- 
tributed log-normally, a distribution with two parameters (mean and variance). Thus, air 
pollution exposure at any given housing site would be completely described if the mean and 
variance for the year’s readings were included. Not including the variance in our housing 
value equation might bias our results, although the strong correlations between moments of 
the frequence distribution suggests that the bias is not very great. Both Anderson and 
Cracker [I] and Wieand [35] reported that their results were not changed when other 
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TABLE VII 
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( - 7.99) 
4 
0.82 
teen stations monitor NOX and 18 monitor particulates. The fits of the calibration 
equations are quite good, the explained variance being 51% for the NOX 
equation and 84% for the PART equation.35 
35 Other housing value studies have not used a meteorological model to derive air pollutant 
concentrations but instead have obtained air pollution data for census tracts by extrapolating 
data from a relatively small number of monitoring stations. Ridker and Henning [27], Ander- 
son and Cracker [l], and Wieand [35] 11 a used St. Louis air pollution data derived from iso- 
pleth maps which were based on a maximum of 41 monitoring stations; Anderson and 
Cracker also used similar data from Washington, D. C., and Kansas City, although the number 
of monitoring stations was not given. Nelson [22] used Washington, D. C. data derived from 
between 9 and 26 mc&toring stations. 
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Table VII gives the results of estimating Eq. (A.1) with NOXP in the equation, 
where p is a parameter to be estimated. This is the “basic equation” used in the 
paper as the starting point for judging the sensitivity of the results to alternative 
specifications of the housing value equation. Table VII also contains the results 
of estimating the same housing value equation using weighted least squares and 
substituting PART for NOX. 
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